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Dedication
John J. McCloy receiving Medal of  Honor from AICPA Chairman B. Z. Lee.
John J. McCloy served as chairman of the Public Oversight Board 
from its inception in 1977 until his resignation in February 1984 for 
personal reasons.
His appointment as member and chairman of the Board brought 
immediate stature and credibility not only to the Board, but also to 
the accounting profession’s enhanced program of self-regulation.
His leadership contributed materially to the Board’s effectiveness. 
He played major guiding roles in formulating and articulating the Board’s 
philosophy regarding self-regulation, in determining the Board’s juris­
diction, and in formulating and implementing the Board’s operating 
policies.
His lasting and significant contribution has made the accounting 
profession’s innovative program of self-regulation effective in serving 
both the public interest and the profession.
Because of his leadership, wise counsel, and warm friendship, the 
members of the Public Oversight Board gratefullv dedicate this report 
to him. We are all richer for having the opportunity to serve with him.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
-----------------------SEC Practice Section • AICPA-------------------------
540 Madison Avenue • New York 10022 • (212) 486-2448
June 30, 1984
To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
Other Interested Parties
It is my pleasure to transmit this sixth annual report of the Public Oversight Board. This report differs 
in some material respects from our previous reports.
As my predecessor remarked in his address of May 9, 1983 to the Council of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants:
“Very few persons outside the profession are aware of what the peer review process is 
about or what it has accomplished. Several years have been spent getting the Division’s 
program in place and functioning. In the past it may have seemed premature to adver­
tise a program still being developed. Now we believe the program has reached the stage 
at which it can be presented with pride as an accomplished fact.”
We believe all users of financial statements should be aware of the accounting profession’s self- 
regulatory program and the success it has attained. We hope this report and the accompanying booklet 
entitled Audit Quality: The Profession’s Program will give readers a better understanding of how the pro­
gram works and an appreciation of its objectives and accomplishments.
This year’s report is dedicated to John J. McCloy, who served as Board chairman from its 
inception until his resignation in February 1984. The AICPA acknowledged its gratitude by awarding 
him its Medal of Honor for his outstanding leadership as charter member and first chairman of the 
Public Oversight Board. Those of us who had the privilege of serving with him recognize that the 
award was richly deserved.
The Board believes that firms belonging to the SEC Practice Section continue to give evidence 
of strong commitment to self regulation and the improvement of quality of services to their clients.
Very truly yours,
A r t h u r  M. W o o d  
Chairman
Highlights
Public Oversight Board Activities
■ Board and staff members actively monitored 
all activities of the Section during the past year 
by:
□ Attendance at all committee meetings and 
a majority of meetings of task forces.
□ Review of all peer reviews completed dur­
ing the year.
□ Review of all litigation alleging audit failures 
of SEC registrants.
■ The Board is convinced that the self-regulatory 
program of the profession is improving the quality 
of accounting and auditing practice of its member 
firms.
■ The Board has published simultaneously with 
the publication of this sixth annual report a booklet 
entitled Audit Quality: The Profession’s Program. The 
booklet describes how the practice of public ac­
counting is regulated at three distinct levels—by 
firms individually, by the profession, and by gov­
ernment; the elements of a quality control system 
of a CPA firm; and the peer review and special 
investigative processes of the SEC Practice Sec­
tion, integral parts of the accounting profession’s 
program of self-regulation. The Board’s oversight 
extends primarily to the operation of the SEC 
Practice Section.
■ Members of the Board elected Arthur M. Wood 
to succeed John J. McCloy as chairman. The Board 
has not yet appointed a member to fill the vacancy 
created by the resignation of Mr. McCloy.
Peer Review Activities o f the Section
■ One hundred forty-four firms were peer re­
viewed in 1983. The reports on all but three reviews 
were processed by the Peer Review Committee as 
of the date of this report. One hundred thirty- 
three of the reports processed were unqualified 
opinions, seven were qualified, and only one 
was adverse.
■ Twenty- three of the firms reviewed in 1983 had 
received a modified report on their initial review
in prior years; all but five of these firms received 
unqualified opinions on their reviews in 1983.
■ Only one firm received an adverse opinion on 
two successive reviews. The Peer Review Com­
mittee accepted the latter report on the condition 
that the firm agree to undertake significant cor­
rective actions imposed by the Committee. Never­
theless, the Board expressed its concern to the 
Section regarding the extended period of time 
over which the firm’s unsatisfactory performance 
had been permitted to continue without more 
decisive action being taken by the firm. In response, 
the Section has notified the firm that proceedings 
leading to the possible imposition of a sanction 
would begin unless the firm took immediate deci­
sive action.
■ Reports on other peer reviews were accepted 
by the Peer Review Committee on the condition 
that the reviewed firms provide assurance that 
they were implementing appropriate corrective 
actions by:
□ Allowing the reviewer or a Committee 
member to revisit the firm to assess the effec­
tiveness of the improvements made.
□ Requiring the firm to make available a 
copy of the report on the subsequent inspec­
tion of its quality control system.
□ Requiring the firm to engage the services 
of a competent person from outside the firm 
to perform a preissuance review of all audit 
engagements.
■ The Board has suggested several improvements 
in the peer review process, which have been acted 
upon to the Board’s satisfaction. Two that have 
been made recently and not yet acted upon are:
□ A peer review report should make reference 
to the letter of comments when such letter is 
issued in conjunction with the report.
□ Additional guidance should be provided 
to reviewers as to when noncompliance with 
the quality control element of inspection 
should result in the issuance of a modified 
report.
■ Several modifications of peer review standards 
and procedures were made during the year, some 
of them at the suggestion of the Board. The more 
important ones were:
□ A reviewer is now required to consider 
litigation alleging audit failure that is required 
to be reported to the Section’s Special Inves­
tigations Committee by the firm as a factor 
in determining the scope of that firm’s forth­
coming peer review.
□ Procedures were established to resolve 
disagreements between a peer reviewer and 
the Peer Review Committee as to the type of 
report to be issued on a specific peer review.
□ To serve as a reviewer, a firm must have 
had its own quality control system peer 
reviewed.
□ Additional information was provided to 
reviewers regarding selection of engagements 
for review where the firm has received fees 
for performance of management advisory 
services (MAS) which exceeded fees for audit 
services.
□ A reviewed firm is now required to docu­
ment the actions it plans to take when a peer 
review team concludes that the firm did not 
perform sufficient procedures to support an 
audit report issued.
Special Investigative Activities o f  the Section
■ Twenty-seven cases alleging failure with res­
pect to the performance of an audit of the finan­
cial statements of an SEC registrant were reported 
by member firms during the year. At the begin­
ning of the year, the Special Investigations Com­
mittee had open files on twenty-five cases reported 
in prior years.
■ The Special Investigations Committee deter­
mined that no case on its agenda warranted a spe­
cial review of a firm’s quality control system in the 
current year.
■ Files on all but twenty cases were closed; four­
teen cases are still undergoing initial investigative
procedures and six are being monitored awaiting 
future developments.
■ The Special Investigations Committee requested 
technical committees of the AICPA to consider 
whether allegations in reported cases indicate a 
deficiency in professional standards or a need for 
additional guidance.
□ As a result of meetings with members of 
the Committee, the AICPA Banking Com­
mittee published additional information 
regarding appropriate bank auditing pro­
cedures and reassessed the adequacy of its 
recently published Bank Audit Guide.
□ The Committee conferred with represen­
tatives of the AICPA Insurance Committee 
to discuss issues raised in reported cases and 
urged the Accounting Standards Executive 
Committee to accelerate its consideration of 
income recognition issues of certain insurance 
industry transactions.
Other Section Activities
■ John W. Zick of Price Waterhouse was elected 
chairman of the Executive Committee succeed­
ing Ray J. Groves of Ernst & Whinney.
■ A special committee—the SECPS Review Com­
mittee— was appointed by the chairman of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Account­
ants to review the structure, operations, and ef­
fectiveness of the Section. The Committee’s report 
has been submitted to the AICPA Board of Direc­
tors for approval and clearance to publish.
■ Membership in the SEC Practice Section increased 
by sixteen firms in the year ended June 30, 1984.
■ Members of the Section audit 85 percent of the 
publicly-traded companies listed in the eleventh 
edition of Who Audits America; these companies 
account for over 98 percent of the combined sales 
of all publicly-traded companies.
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Introduction
The SEC Practice Section and the Private Com­
panies Practice Section constitute the Division for 
CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. The Division was created in 
the fall of 1977 in response to a perceived need for 
a more effective self-regulatory program for the 
accounting profession. This new innovative struc­
ture is concerned with the activities and conduct 
of accounting firms as opposed to those of indivi­
dual accountants. The Public Oversight Board 
oversees the activities of the SEC Practice Section.
This sixth annual report of the Public Over­
sight Board describes the activities of the SEC 
Practice Section during the period July 1, 1983 to 
June 30, 1984.
Clearer Perspective of Self-Regulation
The creation of the Division for CPA Firms 
was a milestone in the history of regulation. No 
other profession has a self-regulatory program 
that is broader in scope or that has had as signifi­
cant an impact on the quality of professional 
practice.
The program was adopted in part to fore­
stall the possibility of increased government 
regulation arising from a series of significant busi­
ness and alleged audit failures in the 1960s and 
1970s. At congressional hearings, concern was 
expressed about the manner in which the account­
ing profession was being regulated and dis­
ciplined. Some congressional leaders suggested 
that Congress should enact legislation to create a 
regulatory organization for accountants similar 
to that governing the securities industry.1
Because it was intended in part to preclude 
action by Congress, the self-regulatory program 
was initially considered by many both within and 
outside the profession to be a substitute for 
government regulation. However, experience 
with the program has convinced the Board that 
self-regulation is not and cannot be a substitute
1 On J u n e  16, 1978, HR 1317 5, A Bill to Establish a National Organiza­
tion of Securities and Exchange Accounting Commission, was proposed 
but not enacted.
for government regulation. Self-regulation, or 
perhaps more properly, peer regulation, is but 
one of three distinct levels of regulation of the 
activities of accountants in public practice. In 
addition to being regulated by peers, practicing 
public accountants are regulated by their firms 
and by various governmental agencies. The methods 
and objectives of these three levels of regulation 
governing the practice of public accounting are 
more fully described in an article authored by 
Board member Robert K. Mautz, which appeared 
in the April 1984 issue of the Journal of Accountancy 
and is reproduced as Exhibit I.
The Board has published a booklet Audit 
Quality: The Profession's Program which serves as a 
companion piece to this report. The booklet de­
scribes in greater detail the structure and prin­
cipal activities of the organizations involved in the 
regulation of accountants, explains the elements 
of a quality control system of a firm in the practice 
of public accounting, and describes the SEC Prac­
tice Section’s peer review and special investigative 
processes.
Activities of the Board
As its name implies, the Board oversees the 
activities of the SEC Practice Section. The Board 
and its staff represent the public interest in the 
Section’s peer regulatory program and actively 
monitor all aspects of the program. The Board 
does not have line authority and has never sought 
such, for it believes that by so doing, it would vio­
late the spirit of self-regulation. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the Board’s role is one of oversight 
only, it has had considerable influence on the 
policy decisions made by the Section, on the ef­
fectiveness of its operations, and on the accom­
plishment of its objectives.
The SEC Practice Section has three major 
committees: the Executive Committee, the Peer 
Review Committee, and the Special Investiga­
tions Committee. Individual Board members are 
assigned liaison responsibilities for each major 
committee. Representatives of the Board attend 
as observers all committee meetings and the pre­
ponderance of meetings of subcommittees and
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task forces. All activities and decisions of the Sec­
tion are reported and discussed at Board meetings, 
which are held monthly or more frequently as 
needed.
The major activity of the Section is ad­
ministering the peer review program. Each mem­
ber firm is required at least triennially to submit 
its quality control system for its accounting and 
auditing practice to an independent review by 
peers. The findings of such review are formally 
reported upon and the report placed in a public 
file. Reports are either unqualified or modified. 
Every peer review report, and some or all of the 
reviewers’ workpapers, are critically examined by 
the Board’s staff A copy of each modified report 
is sent to Board members and discussed at Board 
meetings. In addition, any significant differences 
the staff has with respect to the appropriateness of 
a given report are reported and discussed at 
Board meetings. The Board’s procedures for 
monitoring the peer review process are described 
in another section of this report.
Every litigation matter reported to the Spe­
cial Investigations Committee is reviewed in 
detail by the Board’s staff. Summaries of the 
issues in the case, prepared by the Committee’s 
staff, are sent to all Board members and serve as a 
basis for discussion at Board meetings.
Because of its active involvement in mon­
itoring the program, the Board on several occasions 
has made suggestions for improvement in various 
aspects of the program. It does not hesitate to 
express its dissatisfaction with a decision or pro­
posed decision on a particular matter, such as the 
type of report accepted by the Peer Review Com­
mittee. The Board is satisfied that, on those 
occasions when it has offered another perspective 
on an issue, serious attention has been accorded 
the Board’s views.
Composition of the Board
The Board is a five-member, autonomous 
group with the right to elect its own members and 
chairman, subject to consultation with and con­
currence by the AICPA Board of Directors. At a 
special meeting in February 1984, John J. McCloy 
announced his resignation as chairman and 
member of the Public Oversight Board for per­
sonal reasons. The Board accepted Mr. McCloy’s 
decision with sincere regret. Arthur M. Wood, 
formerly vice chairman, was elected chairman.
As of June 30, 1984, efforts are continuing to 
find a qualified person to fill the vacancy created 
by Mr. McCloy’s resignation. The current com­
position of the Board and its staff is shown in 
Exhibit II. [E D IT O R ’S NOTE: In August 1984, 
Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense, was 
appointed to the Board to fill the vacancy created 
by the resignation of Mr. McCloy.]
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SEC Practice Section
Organization of the Section
The important work of the Section is con­
ducted by its three committees—the Executive 
Committee, the Peer Review Committee, and the 
Special Investigations Committee—whose com­
position is set forth in Exhibit III.
The Executive Committee
The Executive Committee’s major respon­
sibilities include establishing general policies for 
the Section, administering and monitoring all its 
activities, determining membership requirements, 
and imposing sanctions, either on its own initia­
tive or on recommendation of the Peer Review or 
Special Investigations Committees.
The Committee currently consists of twenty- 
one members elected by the AICPA Council for 
three-year terms. The organizational document 
of the Section provides that the Committee shall 
at all times include representatives of all member 
firms that audit financial statements of thirty or 
more registrants under section 12 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934. Currently, fourteen 
member firms qualify for permanent Committee 
representation.
During the year, John W. Zick of Price Water- 
house succeeded Ray J. Groves of Ernst & Whinney 
as Executive Committee chairman.
The Peer Review Committee
The Peer Review Committee’s major responsi­
bilities include establishing standards for perform­
ing and reporting on peer reviews, administering 
the peer review program, and taking whatever 
measures it considers necessary to assure that 
member firms are taking appropriate corrective 
actions as a result of peer review findings.
The Committee can recommend that the 
Executive Committee impose a sanction on a 
firm for failing to take corrective action deemed 
necessary by the Committee. It has not found it 
necessary to do so to date. In every such case, the 
firm agreed to correct quality control system or 
compliance deficiencies and demonstrate appro­
priate corrective action to the Committee as re­
quested. Some actions were extensive in nature, 
precipitating the requirement that the firm demon­
strate implementation of its corrective action plan 
by undergoing another full scope peer review the
following year. Corrective actions required by the 
Committee are detailed in a later section of this 
report.
The Committee consists of fifteen individuals 
from member firms, appointed by the Executive 
Committee. All Committee members have ex­
tensive experience in the audit, review, or quality 
control functions within their firms.
The Special Investigations Committee
The Special Investigations Committee’s major 
responsibility is to perform such investigatory 
procedures as it considers necessary to determine 
whether facts relating to audit failures alleged in 
litigation or formal proceedings and involving 
audits of SEC registrants indicate (1) a possible 
need for corrective action by the member firm in 
question with respect to its quality control policies 
and procedures or compliance with them, or (2) 
that changes in generally accepted auditing stan­
dards, generally accepted accounting principles, 
or quality control standards need to be considered
The Committee consists of nine active or 
former partners of member firms appointed by 
the Executive Committee. Initial appointment is 
for a three-year term, and members are eligible 
for reappointment for a maximum of three addi­
tional one-year terms. All members have exten­
sive experience in the audits of SEC registrants.
The SECPS Review Committee
In February 1983, the chairman of the AICPA 
appointed the SECPS Review Committee, an ad 
hoc committee to review the structure, operations, 
and effectiveness of the SEC Practice Section. The 
objectives of the Committee were to evaluate the 
activities of the Section and to determine whether 
it is accomplishing its mission of improving the 
quality of practice before the Securities and Ex­
change Commission. The Board met with the 
Committee and expressed its views and recom­
mendations. The Board has read the Committee’s 
report of findings and concurs with its recom­
mendations which should enhance the effective­
ness of the Section and a better understanding by 
the public of its objectives and the means used to 
attain those objectives. The Committee’s report 
has been submitted to the AICPA Board of Direc­
tors for approval and clearance to publish.
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The Peer Review Program
Each member firm is required to design and 
implement a quality control system for its account­
ing and auditing practice, as defined in Statement 
on Quality Control Standards No. 1, System of 
Quality Control for a CPA Firm, issued by the AICPA 
Quality Control Standards Committee. The ele­
ments of a quality control system are described in 
the Board’s companion publication entitled Audit 
Quality: The Profession’s Program. In addition, the 
Section has established membership requirements 
that obligate firms to implement practices that go 
far beyond professional standards.
A key membership requirement is that once 
every three years a member firm must have the 
quality control system for its accounting and audit­
ing practice reviewed and reported on by an 
independent third party. The review may be con­
ducted, at the option of the member firm, by 
another member firm, by a team appointed by 
the Peer Review Committee, by a team assembled 
by an association of CPA firms to which the mem­
ber belongs, or by a team assembled by a state 
CPA society. To qualify to administer peer reviews 
for its members, an association or a state society 
must have its administrative plan approved by the 
Peer Review Committee and have any common 
quality control items such as manuals and educa­
tional programs reviewed by an independent third 
party. Currently, nine associations and one state 
CPA society are authorized to administer peer 
reviews for Section members.
Peer Reviews in 1983
In 1983, 144 firms were required to undergo 
a peer review; 119 of these were reviews of firms 
that had previously undergone review and 25 
were initial reviews. Ten of the reviews were full 
scope reviews performed prior to the normal 
triennial requirement, pursuant to conditions 
imposed by the Peer Review Committee because
of its concern that the earlier reviews had dis­
closed the need for extensive corrective action to 
eliminate serious system deficiencies. All but three 
of the 144 peer review reports were accepted by 
the Committee as of June 30, 1984.
An unqualified report is issued when the 
review discloses that the firm’s quality control sys­
tem met the objectives of quality control stan­
dards and was being complied with to provide the 
firm with reasonable assurance of conforming 
with professional standards. As indicated in Chart 
A, over 94 percent of the firms reviewed in 1983 
received an unqualified opinion, representing an 
increase in excess of 10 percentage points over 
firms receiving such reports in prior years.
A substantial majority of firms receiving un­
qualified reports also receive letters of comments 
which report (1) deficiencies noted in the quality 
control system or in compliance by the firm’s per­
sonnel with its quality control policies and pro­
cedures and (2) recommendations for corrective 
action. While such corrective action would result 
in substantial improvement in the firm’s quality 
control system or in compliance with its quality 
control policies and procedures, the identified 
deficiencies are not so serious as to negate the 
conclusion that the reviewed system provides the 
firm with reasonable assurance of compliance 
with professional standards. Only 12 percent of 
the firms reviewed in 1983 (and 7 percent of the 
firms reviewed in prior years) did not receive a let­
ter of comments. In most instances, firms receiv­
ing an unqualified opinion without a letter of 
comments were single-office firms.
Reviewed firms are required to respond in 
writing to each item in the letter of comments stat­
ing whether they have taken or intend to take the 
suggested action to correct the deficiencies or 
their reasons for not doing so.
A qualified report is issued when the review 
discloses significant deficiencies in the firm’s quality
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CHART A Comparison of Types of Reports Issued on Reviews of
SEC Practice Section Member Firms in 1983 and in Prior Years
Firms receiving 
unqualified opinion □ Firms receiving qualified opinion □ Firms receiving adverse opinion
control policies and procedures, a significant lack 
of compliance with such policies and procedures, 
and/or a significant lack of compliance with other 
membership requirements. Only 5 percent of the 
firms reviewed in 1983 received a qualified opin­
ion, a significant drop from 13 percent in prior 
years.
An adverse report is issued when the review 
discloses that the firm’s quality control system is 
not sufficiently comprehensive or not being com­
plied with in a manner that provides the firm with 
reasonable assurance that it is complying with 
professional standards. Only one of the 141 reports 
processed on 1983 reviews was adverse, whereas 
13 of 473 or 2.7 percent of the reports issued on 
reviews conducted in 1982 and prior years were 
adverse. As indicated, reports on three 1983 re­
views remain unprocessed by the Committee as 
of Ju n e  30, 1984, for various technical reasons.
The percentage decrease in the number of 
qualified and adverse opinions is, in the opinion 
of the Board, direct evidence that the peer review 
process is improving the quality of practice of 
member firms. As previously noted, 119 firms 
reviewed in 1983 had undergone a prior review.
The Committee reviews the findings and the 
report issued on each review to ascertain whether 
peer review standards have been observed and
whether the firm is responsive to the reviewer’s 
findings and recommendations. If satisfied with 
the report, letter of comments and response, the 
Committee places these documents in a file main­
tained by the Section for public inspection.
Improvement in Quality of Practice 
by Member Firms
Most firms are found by peer reviewers to 
have effective systems of quality control. However, 
a few of the systems reviewed are found to have 
serious deficiencies, which the firms agree to 
remedy. Results obtained on subsequent peer 
reviews provide convincing evidence of the serious 
commitment Section members have made to im­
prove the quality of their accounting and auditing 
services.
Twenty-three of the firms reviewed in 1983 
had received a modified opinion on their initial 
review. Ten of the firms were undergoing an ac­
celerated review, pursuant to a condition imposed 
by the Committee when it accepted the report on 
the firm’s initial review. Of the twenty-three mod­
ified opinions, eighteen were qualified and five 
were adverse.
On the subsequent review, sixteen of the 
eighteen firms receiving a qualified opinion on
11
their initial review received an unqualified opin­
ion on their 1983 review. Two of the five firms 
receiving an adverse opinion on their initial review 
received an unqualified opinion on their 1983 
review, two received qualified opinions, and one 
received another adverse opinion.
The report of the firm again receiving an 
adverse opinion was accepted by the Committee 
with the condition that the firm agree to some 
extremely stringent corrective actions, including, 
among other things, the engaging of a qualified 
reviewer from outside the firm to perform pre­
issuance reviews of all audit reports and related 
workpapers. The Board has expressed its concern 
to the Section’s Executive Committee regarding 
the extended period of time over which the firm’s 
unsatisfactory performance had been permitted 
to continue without more decisive action being 
taken. Accordingly, the Peer Review Committee 
has formally notified the firm that failure to take 
the required corrective actions immediately will 
cause it to begin proceedings leading to the pos­
sible imposition of a sanction.
Another case illustrates the success the Peer 
Review Committee has had working with a firm 
that was highly motivated to overcome its serious 
quality control deficiencies. The firm received an 
adverse opinion on its initial peer review in 1980. 
As a result, the firm was reviewed again in 1982. 
The results indicated that the firm had made 
some improvement but not enough to warrant 
the issuance of an unqualified opinion. The Com­
mittee assigned one of its members to revisit the 
firm periodically to assess the effectiveness of the 
firm’s corrective action plan. The Committee 
member reports that the firm has significantly 
improved the quality of its accounting and audit­
ing services.
The Board especially commends this firm 
and the eighteen firms that received modified 
reports and then made such significant progress 
in improving their quality control systems as to 
warrant unqualified reports on their subsequent 
reviews.
Additional Requirements Imposed on Firms 
by the Committee
During the year, the Committee took various 
actions to assure that firms were effectively imple­
menting corrective action plans in situations where 
the peer review had surfaced serious quality con­
trol deficiencies. Committee actions included:
■ Revisits by the peer reviewer or a Committee mem­
ber (Board staff participated in selected revisits) to 
assess improvements.
■ Obtaining copies of the report of the firm’s inspec­
tion program and, in the case of multioffice firms, 
copies of the inspection reports on individual office 
practice units to assess appropriateness of correc­
tive action plans.
Type of Reviewer
Firms that were reviewed in 1980 were again 
peer reviewed in 1983. A comparison of the types 
of reviewers in 1980 and 1983 shows a definite 
trend of firms selecting another firm to perform 
the review rather than ask the Committee to ap­
point a review team. Almost one-half of the firms 
— 70 of 145 — were reviewed by committee- 
appointed-review-teams (CARTs) in 1980; the 
percentage of firms using CARTs decreased by 19 
percentage points in 1983 — to 41 of 144 firms. 
The types of reviewers used in 1980 and 1983 are 
shown in Chart B.
One possible reason for the greater use of 
CARTs in 1980 was that use of other types of 
reviewers then required the Committee to appoint 
a quality control review panel for each such review, 
which increased the cost to the reviewed firm. The 
panel was eliminated by the Section in 1982, 
upon recommendation of the Board. A study by 
the Board had revealed that the quality control 
review panel could not be cost justified because, 
in general, the panel duplicated the work of the 
primary reviewer and contributed little that was 
not being provided by oversight procedures of 
the Committee and the Board.
The quality of reviews performed by firms 
and associations of firms generally compares favor­
ably with the quality of work performed bv CARTs. 
However, both the Committee’s staff and the 
Board’s staff have noted instances where team 
captains appointed by firms (firm-on-firm reviews) 
or associations (association-administered reviews) 
have not had sufficient experience and/or have 
not adequately planned or participated in and 
supervised the review. As a result, the Committee 
has had to defer acceptance of several reports of 
firm-on-firm and association-administered reviews 
and require that:
■ Additional work be performed because the scope of 
the review did not test a reasonable cross-section of 
the firm’s accounting and auditing practice.
■ Reconsideration be given to achieving greater cor­
relation between the review findings and the type of
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CHART B Comparison of Types of Reviewers 
in 1980 and 1983 Peer Reviews
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
□  1980 Total145 1983
Total
144
*Includes one review team appointed by a state CPA society 
authorized by the Peer Review Committee to administer 
such a program.
report issued and the items included in the letter 
of comments.
■ “Open question” be resolved concerning the reviewed 
firm’s possible noncompliance with professional 
standards on some of its accounting and auditing 
engagements.
The Committee has dealt effectively with 
these types of substandard peer review perfor­
mance. For example, one firm has been asked 
and agreed to subject future peer review reports to 
a preissuance review by another partner experi­
enced in quality control systems. One association 
with a number of troublesome reviews has been 
required to submit all future reviews to on-site 
oversight by a Committee member and to reim­
burse such member for expenses incurred.
Performance by CARTs was generally of high 
quality. A reviewer whose performance is graded 
as unsatisfactory is not appointed to another CART. 
Also, eligibility for appointment to a CART ordi­
narily requires attendance at a peer review train­
ing program. The Committee presented such 
programs again in 1984. The Board’s staff reviewed 
and suggested refinements in the training materials 
and acted as course instructors as well.
Continuing Modification of 
Standards and Procedures
The peer review process is well past the 
experimental stage, yet it is still evolving. The 
evolutionary development of the process is con­
tinuing at a healthy rate as is evidenced by the 
changes that took place during the past year. Many 
of the changes resulted from suggestions made by 
the Board, the Executive Committee, the Special 
Investigations Committee, and the SEC staff. In­
cluded among the more important changes are 
the following:
Consideration of Litigation Alleging Audit Failure
Peer review guidelines were silent as to whether 
a reviewer had to consider pending litigation alleg­
ing audit failure as a factor in setting the scope of a 
peer review. A reviewer is now required to con­
sider whether litigation alleging audit failure that 
is required to be reported to the Special Inves­
tigations Committee by the firm should be con­
sidered in determining the scope of that firm’s 
forthcoming peer review. Such consideration may 
suggest that specific offices, personnel, audits in a 
particular industry, certain quality control ele­
ments, or accounting issues may require special 
attention. This modification of the peer review 
guidelines does not diminish in any wav the im­
portant work of the Special Investigations Com­
mittee, which is discussed in a later section of 
this report.
Qualifications of Reviewers
The only qualification for a firm to serve as a 
peer reviewer in the early years was that it be a 
member of the Section. To be eligible to conduct 
peer reviews, a firm must now itself have been 
peer reviewed. While it is not expected that firms
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receiving a modified or an adverse report will be 
selected to conduct another firm’s peer review, 
the Board has noted that the Peer Review Com­
mittee of the Private Companies Practice Section 
requires that a firm must have received an un­
qualified opinion on its own review to be eligible 
to serve as a reviewer. The Board believes that the 
SEC Practice Section should consider adopting a 
similar rule.
Resolution o f Disagreements
Until this year, there was no provision for 
resolving a disagreement between the Committee 
and a reviewer with respect to the type of report to 
be issued. Though such disagreements are few in 
number, the question sometimes arises as to 
whether a particular report should be unqual­
ified or qualified. Such disagreements have even­
tually been resolved by the reviewers accepting 
the Committee’s position or convincing the Com­
mittee of the merit of their judgm ent.
Under the new procedure, if a review team 
and the Committee should now disagree on the 
appropriateness of the report issued, the Com­
mittee, in certain circumstances, may appoint a 
special task force to perform an independent review 
and issue its own report which will be placed in 
the public file. Or, the review team’s report may 
be placed in the public file together with a memo­
randum citing the reasons for the Committee’s 
disagreement with that report.
Effect o f MAS Engagements on Independence
The SEC and others have observed that the 
fees received for performance of management 
advisory services (MAS) may be perceived as an 
impairment of the independence of the auditor. 
Guidelines for testing compliance with the Sec­
tion’s membership requirements now require 
the reviewer to ascertain whether the firm per­
formed MAS engagements for an SEC registrant 
for which the MAS fees exceeded the audit fees. 
Reviewers are required to consider this informa­
tion when selecting MAS engagements for testing 
compliance with the independence requirements. 
The Board believes that audit engagements per­
formed for such clients (i.e., those for whom the 
firm also performed MAS engagements) should 
be included in the sample of audit engagements 
to be reviewed, especially if MAS fees exceeded 
audit fees for three consecutive years.
Non- GAAS Audits
Professional literature prior to September 
1983 was silent as to what an auditor was required
to do when he learned that he had not performed 
all audit procedures considered necessary for the 
issuance of an audit report he had already released. 
In September 1983, the Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) issued Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 46, Consideration of Omitted Procedures After the 
Report Date, which specifies actions that an auditor 
should take in such circumstances. This ASB pro­
nouncement resulted from a concern expressed 
by the Board, and shared by the SEC, that auditors 
be given more definitive guidance in these matters.
When a peer review team reviews an engage­
ment and concludes that the firm did not perform 
sufficient procedures to support the audit report 
issued, the team is unable to ascertain whether 
the financial statements were prepared in accord­
ance with generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples. Under these conditions, the firm is required 
to document the actions it plans to take or its basis 
for concluding that no action is required. If the 
review team believes that the firm’s decision is 
inappropriate, the matter is referred to the Peer 
Review Committee for action. Procedures for 
resolution of differences between the Committee 
and a member firm are now in place.
Timely Submission o f Peer Review Reports
Some peer review reports were not being 
submitted to the Committee for processing on a 
timely basis. To expedite the reporting of review 
results, commencing with the reviews performed 
in 1983, team captains are now required to trans­
mit the report and letter of comments to the 
reviewed firm within thirty days of completing 
the review or face the possibility of sanctions. The 
reviewed firm is then required to forward the 
report, letter of comments, and its response to the 
Committee within thirty days after receipt of the 
report and letter of comments or face the possibility 
of sanctions. The new policy has improved the 
timeliness of submission of peer review reports.
During the past year, Committee task forces 
have become involved in the resolution of com­
plex problems on several peer reviews, including 
two of the three unprocessed reviews at June 30, 
1984. The resolution of complex problems under­
standably is a time-consuming process, and the 
Board recognizes the time and effort that various 
members of the Committee have expended this 
year in problem resolution.
Areas for Improvement
The Board believes there are areas where 
further improvement can be effected. Uniformity 
in the reporting of peer review findings is one of
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these. The determination of whether deficiencies 
uncovered in a peer review are sufficiently signifi­
cant to warrant issuing a modified report is a 
highly qualitative, judgmental matter. In several 
instances, reviewers have issued unqualified opin­
ions in circumstances in which the Board believes 
other reviewers faced with the same set of facts 
would issue modified reports. In these cases, defi­
ciencies have been reported in the letter of com­
ments as areas for substantial improvement and 
the letter of comments is placed in the public file. 
However, since a reviewed firm may distribute its 
report to clients or prospective clients without the 
attendant letter of comments, a firm receiving an 
unqualified report without a letter of comments 
may have a comparative advantage over the firm 
receiving an unqualified report with a letter of 
comments. Accordingly, the Board believes that a 
reference should be placed in each report, where 
appropriate, to the effect that a letter of com­
ments was issued in conjunction with the issuance 
of the report.
A second matter that requires reconsider­
ation— and additional guidance—is when a report 
should be modified because the firm did not per­
form an annual inspection as required by quality 
control standards. During the year, the Peer Review 
Committee, while concluding that an annual in­
spection is an important activity for all firms, 
nevertheless agreed that the peer review report of 
firms with fewer than twenty professionals need 
not be modified for lack of timely performance of 
inspection during the intervening years between 
peer reviews, provided no other significant deficien­
cies were noted during the review. Noncompliance 
with the inspection requirement, however, is re­
quired to be reported in the letter of comments.
The Board recognizes that the rule on the 
size of firm was an arbitrary one and does not 
question the Committee’s judgment on that mat­
ter. However, the Board notes that the Commit­
tee applied the concept underlying the rule to the 
review of a larger firm. The Board has informed 
the Committee that the rule should be either 
enforced or eliminated, rather than applied in 
what the Board believes is an inconsistent manner.
Substandard Performance on 
Individual Engagements
The peer review process also deals with in­
stances of substandard auditing or accounting 
performance on individual engagements, which 
are reported promptly to the Committee. During
1983, peer reviewers reviewed the financial state­
ments, reports, and workpapers for 1,315 audit 
engagements. Thirty-three of these were deemed 
to be substandard in the application of generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). In two of fif­
teen cases in which the financial statements were 
not in accordance with GAAP, the firm immedi­
ately recalled its report and the financial statements 
were reissued. The remaining cases generally in­
volved reports given limited distribution and did 
not require immediate recall; however, the firms 
agreed to cause the deficiencies to be corrected in 
the subsequent year’s report.
The Board’s staff found reviewers diligent in 
pursuing instances of noncompliance with GAAP 
or GAAS. The fact that two-and-one-half percent 
of the engagements reviewed were identified as 
substandard reflects the objectivity of the reviewers. 
In each instance where the peer reviewers con­
cluded that the audit had not been performed in 
accordance with GAAS, the firm either immedi­
ately recalled its report and the financial statements 
to perform the procedures in a subsequent immi­
nent audit. Table 1 summarizes the actions taken 
by the firms in connection with engagements 
found not to have been performed in accordance 
with professional standards.
TABLE 1 Corrective Action Required by Peer Review 
Committee with Respect to Substandard 
Audit Engagements Identified in Peer 
Reviews Performed in 1983
Number of audit engagements reviewed.............................. 1,315
Number of audit engagements considered substandard 
by peer reviewers ............................................................... 33
(2.5%)
Corrective Actions Required
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised
and reissued.......................................................................  2
Omitted auditing procedures performed ..............................  5
Omitted auditing procedures—firm has not yet informed
Committee of actions to be taken*..................................... 3
Cause of impairment of independence elim inated...............  1
GAAP and GAAS deficiencies not requiring immediate action 
to be corrected in subsequent year's au d it.............................. 22
Total ....................................................................................  33
*Engagements identified in review processed by Committee in 
March 1984.
The fact that even a small percentage of en­
gagements is deemed not to have been per­
formed in accordance with professional standards
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is disturbing. Nevertheless, it was concluded that 
these were not the result of systems deficiencies 
but generally because of what is sometimes referred 
to as “people problems.” The Board takes com­
fort from the fact that, absent the peer review pro­
cess, these instances of substandard performance 
may have gone undetected for a much longer 
period of time and could have eventuated in in­
vestor losses if it were not for timely discovery 
and correction.
Monitoring of MAS Engagements
Member firms are required to report certain 
information regarding fees received for manage­
ment advisory services (MAS) engagements. Such 
information is included in the firm’s annual report 
which is placed in the public file. Analysis of the 
MAS data reported by members of the Section 
indicates that almost 90 percent of member firms 
generate fees from performance of MAS engage­
ments that are less than 20 percent of total fees. A 
recent analysis shows:
Number of 
Section Members
Percentage of MAS Fees 
to Total Fees
0-9% 10-19% 20-50%
Over
50% Total
With SEC clients . . . . 123 57 15 1 196
With no SEC clients . . 118 80 36 2 236
Total ........................ . 241 137 51 3 432
Percentage ............. . 55.8% 31.7% 11.8% 0.7% 100.0%
Section monitoring of MAS engagements is 
accomplished in two ways:
■ Firms must report the number of SEC clients for 
which MAS fees are in excess of 100 percent of fees 
for audit services for three consecutive years.
■ Tests are performed during the triennial peer review 
to determine whether the firm has:
□ Complied with the AICPA Code of Ethics and
Statements on Standards for Management Advisory 
Services dealing with independence in performing 
MAS engagements for SEC clients.
□ Abstained from performing stipulated MAS en­
gagements proscribed by the Section.
□ Reported to the audit committee of board of 
directors of each SEC client the amount of MAS fees 
received and the services performed.
Peer review teams test compliance with these 
membership requirements by using special work 
programs designed by the Section’s Peer Review 
Committee. These procedures have not surfaced 
any evidence that suggests that proscribed services 
have been performed or that performance of MAS 
by member firms has diluted the objectivity re­
quired in performance of the audit function.
Board Oversight of Peer Review Process
Representatives of the Board actively mon­
itor the peer review process by attending all meet­
ings of the Peer Review Committee and its Evalua­
tion Subcommittee and by monitoring individual 
peer reviews. Each review is subjected to one of 
three types of Board oversight: (1) observing the 
performance of the field work, attending the exit 
conference where the results are reported to firm 
management, and reviewing the team’s work- 
papers, report, and letter of comments, and the 
reviewed firm’s letter of response; (2) reviewing 
the workpapers and the report and letters issued; 
or (3) reviewing selected reviewers’ workpapers 
including the summary review memorandum and 
the report and letters issued. During the current 
year, the Board observed reviews in process of all 
but one of the firms with five or more SEC clients 
and, based on selected criteria, visited a number 
of firms with fewer than five SEC clients and a rep­
resentative number of firms with no SEC clients. 
Chart C summarizes this phase of the Board’s 
oversight.
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The Board finds its access to the peer review 
activities of the Section entirely satisfactory for 
discharge of its oversight responsibilities. Discus­
sion at Committee meetings is free and frank, and 
Board members and its staff have adequate oppor­
tunity to express their views and to receive response 
to such expressions. The Board is convinced that 
this aspect of the self-regulatory process is function­
ing effectively and accomplishing the purposes 
for which intended.
CHART C Scope of Board Oversight of 1983 Peer Reviews Classified by Number of SEC Clients of 
Reviewed Firms
0 25% 50% 75% 100%
No. of SEC 
Clients
30 or More
_______________  _______________ No. of Firms
1111
5 to 29 1514 1
1 to 4 5710 28 19
None 615 21 35
Total 14440 50 54
  Visitation and workpaper review Workpaper review Report review
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Special Investigative Process
Member firms are required to report to the Spe­
cial Investigations Committee each litigation or 
proceeding (case) against them or members of 
their firms involving allegations of failure in the 
conduct of an audit of the financial statements of 
an SEC registrant. This requirement became ef­
fective for litigation or proceedings initiated on or 
after November 1, 1979. The Committee deter­
mines whether the allegations of audit failure 
indicate a need for improvements in the quality 
control systems of the reporting firms or com­
pliance with them or whether changes in pro­
fessional standards are required.
Objectives of the Process
The activities of the Special Investigations 
Committee supplement the peer review process 
as a means of protecting users of financial state­
ments. The Committee’s investigative process 
focuses on reducing the possibility of future failures 
by(1) identifying deficiencies in the firm’s quality 
control system that may have permitted the alleged 
deficiency to occur and (2) causing such deficien­
cies to be corrected.
Operation of the Committee
For each reported case, the member firm is 
required to provide copies of the complaint, rele­
vant financial statements, SEC or other regulatory 
filings, and, if requested, other relevant public 
documents. The staff of the Committee prepares 
a summary of the submitted data, identifying the 
accounting, auditing, and quality control issues 
involved. Copies of all documents and the staff 
summary are sent to all Committee members.
One or two Committee members are assigned 
as a task force to study the issues in each reported 
case and to make recommendations to the Com­
mittee as to the action that should be taken. Each 
case is subjected to prescribed initial investigative 
procedures, during which the task force considers 
the nature of the allegations and their implications. 
In some cases, analysis of the complaint and the 
financial statements to which it relates permit the 
Committee to conclude that the allegations are 
without merit. In other cases, the procedures are 
supplemented by a discussion of the allegations 
between representatives of the task force and the 
firm and a review of the findings of the firm’s most 
recent peer review.
If the results of the initial investigative pro­
cedures warrant, the case is monitored in order to 
follow and evaluate future developments, such as 
the issuance of a report of a peer review in process 
or the issuance of a bankruptcy trustee’s report.
If the allegations appear to indicate that there 
may be serious deficiencies in, or compliance 
with, the firm’s quality control system, the Com­
mittee will order a special review of those aspects 
of the firm’s system that, if effective, ordinarily 
should prevent or detect deficiencies of the type 
alleged to have occurred. Such a review involves 
application of procedures identical to those used 
in peer review. The Section has adopted a policy 
which requires cost of the special review to be 
borne by the firm.
Files are closed on cases when the Commit­
tee concludes that the allegations appear not to 
have merit, do not indicate a deficiency in the 
firm’s quality control system, or if a deficiency 
may have existed, that appropriate corrective action 
has been taken to guard against the possibility of 
future failure.
Activity During the Year
At July 1, 1983, the Committee had open 
files on fifteen cases. Twenty-seven cases were
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added to the Committee’s agenda during the 
year. A summary of the year’s activity is shown in 
Table 2.
TABLE 2 Special Investigations Committee Activity 
for the Year Ended June 30, 1984
Cases
U n d e rg o in g
In i t ia l
In v e s t ig a t iv e
P ro c e d u re s
Cases
B e in g
M o n ito re d
Cases 
R e s u lt in g  
in  a  S p e c ia l 
R e v ie w  o f  th e  
F irm 's  Q u a li ty  
C o n t r o l  S y s te m
Status of cases at
July 1, 1983 ................. 13 10 2
Activity during the year:
Cases added .............
Cases transferred to 
monitoring...............
27
[13] 13
Cases moved from 
special review status 
to permit monitoring 
of firm’s corrective 
action plan ............. 2 [2]
Cases closed ............. [13] [19]
Status of cases at
June 30 , 1984 ............. 14 6 0
As indicated, files on two cases involving 
special reviews were open at the beginning of the 
year. Those two cases were placed in monitoring 
status during the year, pending a determination 
of the effectiveness of the firm’s action plan to cor­
rect deficiencies noted during the special review. 
Other cases are being monitored awaiting the 
outcome of expected future developments. No 
cases reported during the year resulted in the 
Committee’s requiring a member firm to undergo 
a special review. In some cases, the need for a spe­
cial review was obviated by actions initiated by the 
firm involved, where the firm reported its action 
to the Committee and made documentation of 
such action available. Actions taken by firms ranged 
from transfer of personnel and attendant reassign­
ment of specific responsibilities to an intensive 
review of selected aspects of the firm’s quality 
control system.
A more detailed description of the operation 
of the Committee and its decision-making pro­
cess is contained in the Board’s publication entitled 
Audit Quality: The Profession’s Program.
Files on ninety-five cases have been opened 
by the Committee since inception of the program
in November 1979. While most cases involve 
alleged audit failures involving SEC registrants, 
some non-SEC cases were voluntarily reported by 
member firms in response to a request by the 
Committee because of high public interest in the 
case. The Board believes that all such requests of 
the Committee were appropriate and believes 
that the affected firms are to be commended for 
their cooperation.
Since allegations of audit failure involving 
any entity may be indicative of a deficiency in the 
firm’s quality control system or in generally ac­
cepted auditing standards, the SECPS Review 
Committee has recommended extending the liti­
gation reporting requirement to include certain 
cases involving non-SEC registrants. The Board 
believes that the reporting requirement should 
be expanded to include allegations of audit failure 
of companies in which there is a high public 
interest.
Reevaluation of Professional Standards
In addition to assessing the quality control 
implications of allegations in litigation, the Com­
mittee considers whether the allegations indicate 
a deficiency in professional standards or a need 
for additional guidance.
Cases reported during the year prompted 
the Committee to take several such actions. For 
example, noting that similar allegations were made 
in several reported cases involving bank audits, 
the Committee became concerned that the allega­
tions were lessening the confidence of users of 
audited financial statements of banks. As a result, 
the Committee asked the profession’s audit stan­
dard-setters to reassess the effectiveness of current 
bank audit guidance in light of the allegations. 
Members of the Committee met with members of 
the AICPA’s Banking Committee and the chair­
man of the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board. 
As a result, the Banking Committee published 
additional information regarding appropriate bank 
auditing procedures and reassessed the adequacy 
of its recently published Bank Audit Guide.
On other occasions in its brief history, the 
Committee (1) conferred with representatives of 
the AICPA’s Insurance Committee to discuss 
issues raised in cases that may have implications 
on existing standards and (2) urged the AICPA’s 
Accounting Standards Executive Committee to
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accelerate its consideration of income recognition 
issues of certain insurance industry transactions.
Board Oversight of SIC Activities
The Board actively monitors the activities of 
the Committee and its task forces and has com­
plete access to all Committee files. Members of 
the Board’s staff read all the pertinent documents, 
financial information, correspondence related to 
individual cases, as well as the Committee-staff- 
prepared summaries and relevant professional 
literature. Board members are sent copies of each 
case summary, which serves as a basis for discus­
sion at Board meetings. Members of the Board
and/or its staff attend all Committee meetings 
and, at its discretion, meetings of the Commit­
tee’s task forces with firm representatives to dis­
cuss allegations in specific cases.
Activities of the Committee and its decisions 
on each case are reported on and discussed at 
Board meetings. Based on its extensive monitor­
ing, the Board concludes that the Committee has 
effective operational procedures, that Committee 
members take their responsibilities seriously, and 
that the Committee’s decisions are sound and in 
the interest of the public and the profession.
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Membership in the Division
Almost 1,700 firms belong to the Division for 
CPA Firms: 417 belong to both the SEC Practice 
Section and Private Companies Practice Section, 
13 belong only to the SEC Practice Section, and 
another 1,233 firms are members of only the 
Private Companies Practice Section.
Despite the “ loss” of thirty-four members 
through merger, net membership in the Division 
increased by twelve firms — an increase of three 
SECPS-only firms, an increase of thirteen in both
sections, and a loss of four firms that belong only 
to the Private Companies Practice Section. Table 
3 presents an analysis of changes in membership 
for the year ended June 30, 1984, with firms classi­
fied according to whether they do or do not audit 
at least one SEC registrant.
The impact that the Division has on the quality 
of accounting and auditing services cannot be 
judged solely by the number of member firms. 
Member firms audit over 11,500 SEC registrants,
TABLE 3 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms by Number of SEC Clients and by Section— 
July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1984
* All 12 firms that were members of both sections merged with other firms that are members of both sections. Of the 22 PCPS-only firms, 15 
merged with firms that are members of both sections and the remaining 7 merged with other PCPS-only members.
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Firms with 1 or 
more SEC clients
SECPS only 6 — 6 1  1 1 — 7
Both sections 190 7 183 11 [3] 6 4 189
PCPS only 119 2 117 13 2 15 [4] 113
Totals 315 9 306 25 — 22 — 309
Firms with no 
SEC clients
SECPS only 4 — 4 2 — — — 6
Both sections 226 5 221 17 1 7 [4] 228
PCPS only 1,140 20 1,120 152 [1] 155 4 1,120
Totals 1,370 25 1,345 171 — 162 — 1,354
All firms
SECPS only 10 — 10 3 1 1 — 13
Both sections 416 12 404 28 [2] 13 — 417
PCPS only 1,259 22 1,237 165 1 170 — 1,233
Totals 1,685 34 1,651 196 — 184 — 1,663
Number of firms classified by 
firms with and with no 
SEC clients
TABLE 4 Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms —July 1, 1983 and June 30, 1984
Division for CPA Firms SEC Section
July 1 June 30 Increase July 1 June 30
Classification 1983* 1984 (Decrease) 1983* 1984 Increase
Number of firms ...........................................................................  1,651 1,663 8 414 430 16
Number of SEC clients ................................................................. 10,330 11,543 1,213 10,147 11,366 1,219
Number of practice u n its ..............................................................  3,771 3,742 [29] 1,957 1,974 17
Number of professionals..............................................................  100,024 100,846 822 83,925 85,192 1,267
*Adjusted for mergers July 1 , 1983 to June 30, 1984
operate over 3,700 practice units in the United 
States, and employ over 100,000 professionals. 
Details are shown in Table 4.
Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies
Firms that are members of the Division audit 
the financial statements of the vast majority of 
publicly-traded companies. Two hundred fifty- 
four member firms audit over 85 percent of all 
public companies listed in the eleventh edition of 
Who Audits America.2 As shown in Chart D, these 
companies account for over 98 percent of the 
combined sales volume of all publicly-traded 
companies. It should be noted that over 79 per­
cent of the number of companies are audited by 
firms that are entitled to a permanent seat on the 
Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section; 
these companies account for 98 percent of the 
aggregate sales of all publicly-traded companies.
Members of the Division audit all but three 
of the companies whose stocks are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange and all but twenty- 
eight of the companies listed on the American 
Stock Exchange; approximately one-third of these 
are audited by Canadian firms of chartered ac­
countants that are affiliated with firms that are 
members of the Division.
vide the public with the full benefits of the peer- 
regulatory program. The Board shares the view of 
the SEC as reported in its most recent report to 
Congress: “The Commission continues to believe 
that all accounting firms which audit public com­
panies should join the SECPS.” 3
Efforts to increase membership should be 
intensified with special emphasis upon attracting 
auditors of SEC registrants to the SEC Practice 
Section. The Board is aware that the Division is 
giving serious consideration to initiating a mul­
tifaceted program intended to increase mem­
bership and better inform persons both within 
and outside the accounting profession about the 
program and the commitment to high quality ser­
vice that membership in the Division represents. 
The Board urges the Division to implement such 
a program. The investing public would benefit 
from an increase in the number of firms commit­
ted to conduct their practices in accordance with 
the requirements of Division membership.
Membership Promotion
While the statistics cited above are impressive, 
a broader base of membership is desirable to pro-
2 Who Audits America. 11th ed. (Menlo Park, Calif: Data Financial 
Press, 1984).
3 Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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CHART D Analysis of Firms That Audit Publicly-traded Companies 
Listed in the Eleventh Edition of Who Audits America
Number of 
Publicly-traded 
Companies
Annual Sales of 
Publicly-traded 
Companies
Millions of Dollars
Audited by U.S. 
firms that are not 
members of the 
Division
12.08%
(1,120)
Auditors not 1.43%
identified (133)
Audited by foreign 0.67%
firms (62)
1.21%Audited by firms 
that are members of 
Private Companies (112) 
Practice Section 
only
Audited by other 
firms that are 
members of SEC 
Practice Section
5.38%
(499)
Audited by firms 
entitled to 
permanent seat on 
Executive 
Committee 
of SEC Practice 
Section
1.47%
$56,217
Audited by firms 
that are not 
members of the 
Division
98.53%
$3,761,470
Audited by firms 
that are members 
of the Division
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79.23%
(7,345)
SEC Oversight of the Program
The Board maintains a liaison relationship between 
the SEC and the SEC Practice Section. During the 
course of the past year, Board representatives met 
periodically with the SEC Chief Accountant and 
members of his staff to discuss various issues.
The SEC independently evaluates the peer 
review process of the SEC Practice Section, includ­
ing the effectiveness of Board oversight. The SEC 
inspects a sample of peer review team workpapers 
of firms that audit SEC registrants and Board 
oversight workpapers under an arrangement agreed 
to by the Section. All workpapers are masked so as 
not to reveal the identity of individual clients. 
Under a 1982 modification of that arrangement, 
workpapers relating to firms with fewer than ten 
SEC clients are masked to conceal the identity of 
the reviewed firm also in order to reduce further 
the possibility of client identification.
A continuing unresolved issue between the 
Section and the SEC is whether the SEC should be 
given direct access to the activities of the Special
Investigations Committee, or to evidence of those 
activities. Lacking the direct access it desires, the 
SEC asserts it has no basis for independently 
determining the effectiveness of the Committee’s 
discharge of its responsibilities. The Section’s posi­
tion is that confidentiality is essential to the opera­
tion of the Committee; without it, member firms 
would not be as candid and forthright in respond­
ing to inquiries made by the Committee. Dis­
cussions between the Section and the SEC regarding 
this issue were deferred pending completion of 
the SECPS Review Committee’s study, which in­
cludes study of this matter in depth.
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Conclusion
The past six years have given all members of the 
Board a comprehensive understanding of the 
importance of and the difficulties with self-regula­
tion. Our views of self- regulation have been affected 
by an increased understanding of the total pro­
fessional regulatory scheme. The Board views 
regulation of the profession as a complex, inter­
related disciplinary process at three distinct levels 
and involving a number of responsibilities. The 
purpose of professional regulation—continuing, 
satisfactory professional service at a competitive 
price—can be assured only if each of the three 
levels of regulation—private, peer, and public— 
fulfills its responsibility, and if each cooperates 
sufficiently and thus in combination constitute an 
integrated structure, uniform in expectations and 
consistent in requirements.
The Board has come to realize that perhaps 
the most substantial, and certainly the least recog­
nized, force for improvement of professional per­
formance is private regulation, the discipline im­
posed by management of individual firms as they 
strive to meet the demands of competition and to 
achieve professional standards.
Professional or peer- regulation also plays an 
integral role in the overall regulation of the account­
ing profession. The peer review and special inves­
tigative processes of the SEC Practice Section are 
especially vital and effective components of the 
profession’s self-regulatory program.
Members of the Board are sometimes asked 
if it can provide measures of the success of the 
self- regulatory program in the accounting profes­
sion. Our response must be that we have no pre­
cise measurement, but we note considerable evi­
dence provided by independent third parties that 
confirm our conclusion that the program is achiev­
ing its stated objectives. For example,
■ L. Glenn Perry, Chief Accountant of the SEC’s Divi­
sion of Enforcement, finds that “...the accounting
4 L. Glenn Perry, “The SEC’s Enforcement Activities,” The CPA Journal, 
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, New 
York, New York (April 1984).
profession is doing a good job. Its self-regulatory 
efforts have been successful, but they must con­
tinue. Audit performance has been significantly 
improved over the past decade. Additional quality 
controls have been implemented and they are 
working.”4
■ Several departments of the U.S. government, such 
as Energy, Labor, and Agriculture, now require 
accounting firms seeking to provide services to 
those departments to include in their proposals the 
date and results of their latest peer review.
■ On more than one occasion, the SEC has required a 
firm, as part of a consent agreement following an 
enforcement action, to join the SEC Practice Section 
and submit its quality control system to peer review.
■ A Regional Trial Board—an integral part of the 
Joint Ethics Enforcement Program of the AICPA 
and state CPA societies—recently found two mem­
bers guilty of violating technical standards and will 
expel them from the state CPA society and the 
AICPA unless a peer review of their firm has been 
completed on a timely basis.
■ The National Association of State Boards of Ac­
countancy is encouraging state boards to implement 
positive enforcement programs to detect work not 
done in accordance with professional standards 
and to require firms doing such work to undergo a 
peer review.
The Division deserves to be commended 
again this year for continuing its efforts to strengthen 
the quality of auditing and accounting practice by 
its member firms. Nevertheless, its officers and 
members, like the members of the Board, recog­
nize that there is progress yet to be made and such 
progress can be expected.
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Exhibits Exhibit I
SELF-REGULATION -  
CRITICISMS AND 
A RESPONSE
How peer regulation 
works—and 
works well.
by Robert K. Mautz
Criticism is often irritating and sometimes 
helpful. Because of the possibility of helpful­
ness, wisdom requires that the criticism, how­
ever irritating, not be rejected out of hand. 
What, then, to do with it? Experience sug­
gests that criticism should be examined to de­
termine the point of view from which it is 
expressed, then that point of view should be 
analyzed to ascertain whether its perspective 
on the subject criticized is sufficiently appro­
priate that the criticism ought to be heeded.
In the year since I last spoke at the National 
Conference on Current SEC Developments, 
the public oversight board (POB) and the 
American Institute of CPAs self-regulatory 
program have been subjected to outspoken 
criticism. Four are cited here as examples:
“ One CPA in jail would do more than all 
your peer reviews.”
“ Regulators seek out,those who do wrong 
and punish them. That’s what regulators 
do. If you don’t do that, you may have a 
great system for improving professional 
practice, but you do not have self-regula­
tion.”
“ Perhaps the most cynical aspect of the 
[AICPA] division for [CPA] firms is the
Author’s note: Initially presented as my views in a talk pre­
pared for the American Institute of CPAs 11th National Con­
ference on Current SEC Developments, this adaptation has 
since been reviewed by the public oversight board (POB) of 
the SEC practice section (SECPS) of the AICPA division for 
CPA firms and generally expresses the board's sentiments. 
The POB oversees the self-regulatory efforts of the SECPS. 
The conference was held in Washington, D.C., on January 10 
and 11, 1984.
POB. This so-called public board is ap­
pointed by the executive committee of the 
division’s SEC practice section [SECPS], 
which is controlled by the votes of the eight 
largest firms. To date, the POB hasn’t cen­
sured, admonished or disciplined any ac­
counting firm, especially those involved in 
the audit failures.”
“ I have pointed up legal proceeding after 
legal proceeding, SEC action after SEC ac­
tion, against major firm after major firm, 
wherein such firms have been judged to 
have violated GAAP after GAAP and/or 
GAAS after GAAS. All these determina­
tions notwithstanding, our disciplinary ap­
paratus (in the AICPA, the POB and else­
where) appears impotent to proceed against 
the miscreants who are entrenched within 
the Establishment.”
From what perspective do these comments 
come? Apparently, either from regulators or 
from those who believe the AICPA program 
should be judged by the standards of govern­
ment regulators. Does that represent a point of 
view the POB should urge on the SECPS? I 
think not.
One interesting aspect of challenges and 
criticisms is that they need no support. Mere 
utterance gives them status. Responses to 
them, however, especially if they are dis­
agreements, require justification to have any 
standing. What follows is the rationalization 
that has led to my disagreement with the criti­
cisms cited.
ROBERT K. MAUTZ, CPA, Ph.D., is a member of the public 
oversight board of the SEC practice section of the American 
Institute of CPAs division for CPA firms and is director of the 
Paton Accounting Center at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. A member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, Dr. Mautz 
is a past president of the American Accounting Association 
and a former editor of the Accounting Review; he also has 
served on the AICPA council and board of directors. In 1980 
he was awarded the Gold Medal, the Institute’s highest honor.
The Scope of Regulation
Regulation, as it is widely used in general 
conversation and as it was interpreted by the 
founders of the AICPA program, is a broad 
term. Regulation of the practice of accounting 
includes all measures intended to protect the 
public from exploitation and inadequate ser­
vice by accountants. This comprehends a 
wide range of activities. Certainly it includes 
the activities of government regulators as they 
set standards for public practice, license those 
who qualify, establish laws and regulations, 
and seek out and punish wrongdoers. It also 
includes the efforts exerted within a CPA firm 
to avoid errors and mistakes; to provide reli­
able, satisfactory service; to train and super­
vise staff; to inspect the work of practice units; 
to insist on consultation when appropriate; to 
reward partners and employees who do well; 
to discipline those who fail to meet the firm’s 
standards.
Regulation, as the AICPA program con­
ceives of it, includes three distinct levels of 
control, which we can describe as government 
regulation, peer regulation and private regula­
tion.
Government regulation. Government regu­
lation of accounting includes the laws, regula­
tions, licensing requirements, courts, legisla­
tures, commissions and legal procedures 
designed to protect the public from fraud, 
gross negligence and breach of contract by 
accountants acting in their professional capac­
ity. Note that government regulation concerns 
itself with activities below the level of social 
acceptability. Accountants and others who 
run afoul of the law have failed to meet the 
lowest standards acceptable to the communi­
ty. Punishment of some kind, including possi­
ble loss of the privilege to practice, typically 
follows legal establishment of guilt.
The U.S. concept of justice strives to assure 
accountants charged with wrongdoing, as 
well as those who claim to have been injured, 
a fair trial in an adversary proceeding. Plain­
tiffs have the right of discovery; both parties 
are entitled to counsel and judicial propriety.
Government regulation is the most visible 
form of regulation. Few events are considered 
more newsworthy than the arrest and ultimate 
conviction of someone charged with breaking 
the law. This form of regulation is involun­
tary, is imposed with ultimate enforcement 
authority and is accomplished at considerable 
cost. Government regulation is primarily a de­
terrent. It is designed to prevent future occur­
rences of unacceptable behavior by persons 
found guilty. It is also designed to enforce
Reprinted from the April 1984 issue of the Journal of Accountancy
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minimum standards, not necessarily to im­
prove the general level of service; nor is there 
necessarily any continuing effect of enforce­
ment beyond the persons directly involved. 
Contrary to the thought expressed by the first 
critic cited, punishing the convicted has not 
proved to be a great deterrent to others for a 
great many types of unacceptable behavior. 
There is no available evidence that it is more 
successful for accountants.
Peer regulation. Compared with govern­
ment regulation, peer regulation is almost in­
visible. It has minimum media appeal. It is a 
voluntary professional effort conducted by a 
professional organization to improve the qual­
ity of service provided by the members of the 
profession. Some members of the profession 
may work to influence the passage of law s and 
regulations. We do not think of that as peer 
regulation. We do include within that phrase 
the establishment of standards that the mem­
bers of the organization agree to comply with, 
as well as the testing of compliance with those 
established standards.
Because membership in the professional or­
ganization is voluntary, there is little authority 
in support of peer regulation other than peer
“By establishing professional 
standards for quality control and then 
testing firms’ compliance with those 
standards, peer regulation teaches 
the nature of quality control to all 
who are reviewed.”
pressure and possibly some fear that failure to 
meet peer standards will become a competi­
tive disadvantage.
Peer regulation must call for standards 
higher than the legal minimum accepted by 
the community or there is little reason for its 
existence. A professional organization calling 
for nothing more than conformity with the law 
would have little standing. If it called for any­
thing less, it would be a conspiracy. Peer reg­
ulation thus differs from government regula­
tion in a number of ways. It is positive in 
effect, calling for service of higher quality 
than is required under the law. It is also likely 
to have a continuing effect, especially if the 
compliance tests are rigorous and applied con­
sistently. If the standards themselves are re­
viewed and updated periodically, the effect is 
both strengthened and lengthened. Finally, 
peer regulation reaches far more practitioners 
than does government regulation. All mem­
bers of the profession are reached by the for­
mer; only those who fall below society’s norm 
become involved with the latter.
Private regulation. Private regulation, for 
all intents and purposes, is invisible. What 
one does inside one’s own organization is
rarely brought to the attention of others, and 
when it is, the interest tends to be minimal. 
Yet it is the most pervasive and probably the 
most productive of all types of regulation. 
Certainly it affects the most people. Most ac­
countants have their first and perhaps only 
experience with regulation at the level of pri­
vate regulation. It is here— emphasized in 
training classes, manuals and on-the-job ex­
perience— that the young accountant learns 
how professional standards are applied, what 
supervision and review of an audit engage­
ment mean and what the consequences are 
when a supervisor’s expectations are not met. 
Thus, private regulation has the broadest in­
fluence, is directed at improved service and 
can perform to standards as high as the per­
sonal pride of the partners or the demands of 
their competition and clients require. It is es­
sentially constructive in nature, although the 
possibility of punishment is always present.
Private regulation is voluntary. As a firm’s 
management seeks to meet the profession’s 
standards, to provide service at least as good 
as that of competitors and to meet its own 
ideals of quality practice, the partners take 
measures they consider helpful. They do this 
with little fanfare but often at considerable 
cost and strain. The motivation for private 
regulation comes from within a firm; the regu­
latory measures are applied within the firm; 
the benefit from those measures flows directly 
to the firm and its clients. Private regulation—  
the personal response to a variety of stimuli—  
constitutes the ultimate means by which all 
constructive improvement is effected.
Interrelationship of the 
Levels of Regulation
The three levels of regulation are complemen­
tary rather than competitive. None can substi­
tute for another; none is adequate by itself. 
Without the legal powers and authority of 
government regulation, peer or private regula­
tion cannot seek out and punish wrongdoers 
with the effectiveness and justice of public 
regulation. Nor can government regulation 
provide the educational benefits of peer regu­
lation or reach out to the numbers affected by 
private regulation. If those who use the ser­
vices of public accountants are to have the full 
benefits of regulation in all its forms, all three 
levels of regulation must be encouraged and 
strengthened.
Some critics of the current system appear to 
argue that the most effective discipline is 
quick, sure and dramatic punishment. They 
believe that if failure to perform in accordance 
with requirements is discovered and pun­
ished, quality performance by other practi­
tioners will result. I would not argue that 
crime should not be punished, but there is a 
great deal more to regulation than the punish­
ment of crime. Do we want the practice of 
accounting to remain at the minimum level
that society will tolerate, or do we expect pro­
fessional practice to be carried out at a much 
higher level o f service? If the latter is the case, 
we must have the means to teach that require­
ment to all who are expected to meet it.
The Benefits of Peer Review
Those who believe so strongly in punishment 
should have the experience of sitting in on an 
exit conference following a peer review. Al­
most without fail there is an interesting ex­
change of useful ideas, as well as promises to 
forward copies of guides and checklists that 
the reviewing team has found helpful in its 
practice and that the reviewed firm is eager to 
receive and use. For every intentional law­
breaker in accounting, there are thousands of 
dedicated practitioners eager to improve the 
quality of their work. Peer review, an aspect 
of peer regulation, is a remarkably successful 
educational process. By establishing profes­
sional standards for quality control and then 
testing firms’ compliance with those stan­
dards, peer regulation teaches the nature of 
quality control to all who are reviewed. In 
addition, it carries to firm after firm word of 
what other firms are doing to measure up to 
those quality control standards as efficiently 
and effectively as possible.
In addition to the educational function of 
peer review, there is some highly desirable 
discipline. In anticipation of a peer review, a 
firm must document its quality control for the 
reviewers. Development of this document 
necessarily turns the firm’s attention inward, 
toward its quality control policies and proce­
dures. Management must ask, “ Exactly what 
are we doing— and not doing— to maintain 
the quality of control over all aspects of our 
professional activities that our peers will ex­
pect of us?”
Members of the review team use this docu­
ment in two ways. First, they ascertain wheth­
er the standards claimed meet the quality con­
trol standards of the profession. Second, they 
scrutinize evidential matter indicative of the 
firm’s policies and the implementation of 
those policies to discover the extent to which 
the firm adheres to the quality control stan­
dards alleged to constitute its practice. The 
discovery by the reviewers of any material 
failure to perform in compliance with the 
Firm’s own quality control document results in 
a specific description of the failure. The facts 
of the description are cleared with the partner 
or the responsible staff member of the re­
viewed firm, and the description is included in 
the peer review work papers along with the 
firm’s response to the charge of a deficiency 
in its quality control.
The Question of Sanctions
Now we come to the matter of sanctions, or 
punishments. The “ Organizational Structure 
and Functions of the SEC Practice Section of
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Exhibit I/continued
the AICPA Division for CPA Firms” grants 
to the executive committee the authority to 
impose sanctions on member firms following 
appropriate disciplinary proceedings.1 These 
sanctions include
□  ” [Requiring| corrective measures by the 
firm including consideration by the firm of 
appropriate actions with respect to individual 
firm personnel.
□  “ Additional requirements for continuing 
professional education.
□  “ Accelerated or special peer reviews.
□  “ Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
□  “ Monetary fines.
□  “ Suspension from membership.
□  “ Expulsion from membership."2
To date, no official sanction has been im­
posed by the executive committee on any 
member of the SECPS. This fact has caused 
some criticism by those who consider govern­
ment regulation to be the model for all regula­
tory efforts.
Their views have been expressed to me in 
these general terms: “ A regulatory pro­
gram— call it self-regulation or whatever you 
will— that does not impose sanctions has no 
credibility. Not only must sanctions be im­
posed, their imposition must be a matter of 
public knowledge, and they must be suffi­
ciently severe to be impressive. Your system 
must have teeth in it, or it will have no public
“Public accounting firms know a great 
deal about sanctions; they apply 
them on a private basis promptly, 
effectively and as often as needed.”
standing.” These are contentions that require 
consideration.
Although the executive committee is the 
only body that has the authority to impose 
sanctions officially, in fact the equivalent of 
sanctions is already being proposed by others 
at a number of points in the system and volun­
tarily accepted by the firms to which pro­
posed.
When a peer review is completed, the for­
mal report on the review, prepared by the 
team captain, is forwarded by the reviewed 
firm to the peer review committee for accep­
tance and inclusion with accompanying pa­
pers in the public file. With the formal report, 
the peer review committee receives a copy of 
the letter of comment, which mentions all de­
ficiencies in quality control not cleared during 
the review, as well as the firm’s response to 
each of them. If the peer review committee is 
not satisfied with the report, the letter of com-
1 American Institute of CPAs Division for CPA Firms. SEC 
Practice Section. “ Organizational Structure and Functions of 
the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms”  (sec. 1), SECPS Manual, rev. ed. (New York: 
AICPA, 1983).
2Ibid.. p. 1-15.
ment or the firm’s responses, it will refuse to 
accept the report until an appropriate response 
or modification has been made. In some in­
stances this “ appropriate response,” in the 
view of the peer review committee, is the 
equivalent of a sanction. Let me offer some 
examples:
□  In the 1980 peer review of firm A, two 
engagements were considered by the review­
ers to be non-GAAS and the audit work papers 
were seriously deficient in documentation. 
Both engagements were in specialized indus­
tries. The engagement partner, who is also the 
firm’s managing partner, was judged to be 
technically deficient in accounting and audit­
ing matters. The peer review committee in­
sisted that the firm adopt additional quality 
control procedures to monitor the perfor­
mance of the managing partner when he 
served as an audit engagement partner. His 
partners concluded that another form of cor­
rective action was preferable, and the peer 
review committee agreed. The firm relieved 
the managing partner of all engagement re­
sponsibilities; he is now concerned only with 
administrative matters.
□  In the course of the 1980 peer review of 
firm B, seriously deficient engagements were 
identified in a branch office managed by a 
manager without adequate partner oversight. 
In its letter of response the firm reported that 
the manager had been transferred to another 
office and a technically proficient partner had 
been assigned to manage the branch office in 
question. The peer review committee found 
these measures satisfactory.
□  The 1981 peer review of firm C concluded 
that a construction-company audit engage­
ment had been performed in a substandard 
way. The peer review committee agreed to 
accept the firm’s peer review report on the 
condition that the firm agree to have a full- 
scope review of the engagement by someone 
with adequate knowledge of the industry be­
fore issuance of the report.
□  Firm D received an adverse report on its 
1980 peer review. The peer review committee 
required the firm to undergo another full peer 
review within two years rather than the nor­
mal three-year term required by the member­
ship rules. The 1982 report was a modified 
one. Serious engagement deficiencies were 
found in both the 1980 and 1982 reviews. The 
peer review committee required the firm to 
subject the specific engagements in question 
to an on-site review by a member of the peer 
review committee. The reviewing member 
recommended, and the full committee con­
curred, that, as a condition of continuing 
membership, the firm had to engage the ser­
vices of an outside consultant (1) to perform 
reviews of all audits before issuance of audit 
reports and (2) to oversee the firm’s annual 
inspection program. Correspondence on these 
matters is in the public file.
Similar activities are part of the work of the 
special investigations committee (SIC):
□  In one SIC investigation the review of an 
office found that, although no engagement 
was judged an audit failure, several sets of 
audit work papers were considered to be mate­
rially deficient in documentation. In the 
course of the investigation, and working in 
conjunction with selected members of the 
SIC, the firm developed a corrective action 
plan for that office. The plan contained three 
major provisions: (1) partners from another 
office will do a preissuance review of reports 
and audit work papers of all audit engage­
ments (non-SEC engagements as well as SEC 
engagements) of the office in question, (2) the 
assigned preissuance reviewers will partici­
pate in the development and approval of the 
audit plan for each engagement and (3) sever­
al partners in the office were relieved of audit 
responsibilities.
□  In another case the SIC discovered, 
through inquiry, that the partner assigned to 
perform a preissuance review on an audit of an 
SEC client had not performed that review on a 
timely basis. As a result, the noncompliance 
of the offending partner was brought to the 
attention of the firm’s top management, and 
the firm issued a strongly worded written re­
minder to all partners on the importance of 
complying with the firm's and the SECPS's 
requirements of a concurring partner preis­
suance review on all SEC engagements— an 
effective indirect, if not direct, reprimand.
The sanctions described are actual, yet they 
represent a small proportion of the total issued 
within the less visible portions of our entire 
regulatory effort. In participating in the re­
views of some of the first investigations per­
formed under the SIC's direction, the POB 
learned that by the time the SIC investigation 
had begun, the firms involved had already 
completed internal inquiries of their own and 
had taken action that sometimes included 
transferring partners and managers to less re­
sponsible positions and bringing in others to 
replace them.
Those who conceive of a public accounting 
firm as straining to protect an inept or dishon­
est partner or manager should think again. 
Self-interest on the part of the members of the 
firm demands that the incompetent, the care­
less and the venal be removed from any posi­
tion in which they can expose the firm to 
harm. Public accounting firms know a great 
deal about sanctions; they apply them on a 
private basis promptly, effectively and as of­
ten as needed.
Consider the plight of a partner who has 
been terminated for reasons of unsatisfactory 
performance. He has been found inadequate 
by his most intimate peers. Accepted by them 
into professional partnership— with all that 
implies— he has been judged unworthy of that 
trust. His opportunity for finding employment
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at anything like his previous compensation is 
slight, indeed. He may not be in jail, but he 
has been punished severely and is an object 
lesson to all who comprehend the nature and 
severity of his former partners' action.
Similar sanctions have been imposed at the 
level of private regulation as a direct result 
of peer review, without ever getting to the 
peer review committee or the SIC. The peer 
review process has brought home to member 
firms of all sizes the importance of quality 
control and the nature of the measures re­
quired to maintain it. In recent discussions 
with a peer review team leader who had per­
formed a number of such reviews of small 
firms, he responded to the POB’s questions by 
citing several cases in which reviewed firms 
had taken quick action to strengthen the qual­
ity of their organizations once deficiencies 
had been pointed out. One case involved the 
partner in charge of quality control in the re­
viewed firm. The peer review established that 
he had little understanding of, or respect for. 
quality control. When this fact was pointed 
out to the managing partner, together with 
data in support of that contention, the man 
was removed from his position immediately.
The partner who discussed this case noted 
several other examples, including some in his 
own firm. Peer review, in his judgment, 
which is based on direct experience in his own 
firm and elsewhere, is an effective force for 
improving the quality of professional practice 
in those firms that take advantage of it.
The Issue of Confidentiality
Some of the profession’s critics would say 
that for all intents and purposes the illustra­
tions provided thus far are nonpublic— that is, 
no one knows about them because they have 
not been publicized. They contend that sanc­
tions must be publicized to carry the message 
that the AICPA self-regulatory program is 
credible. There is truth in the assertion that the 
discipline described gains little public atten­
tion; whether that denies its usefulness in es­
tablishing credibility is an assertion without 
supporting evidence.
There are reasons for confidentiality, but 
the issue of confidentiality is a complex one, 
involving private rights, the public interest, 
the litigious nature of our society and a wide­
spread misunderstanding of the role, rights 
and responsibilities of independent accoun­
tants serving in their capacity as auditors. The 
resolution of so fundamental an issue, compli­
cated as it is by so many factors, should not be 
attempted here.
My expectation is that, by the time the next 
POB annual report is issued, some means will 
have been found, either in that report or else­
where, to disclose the extent and nature of the 
disciplinary actions imposed within the 
AICPA program.
The Public Image Problem
The public image of auditing suffers greatly 
from a combination of circumstances. The 
first is the tendency to believe the worst of our 
fellows, especially if there is litigation involv­
ing an alleged audit failure. Time after time, I 
have observed that the latest allegations pub­
lished in the Wall Street Journal or elsewhere 
were being accepted at face value. Later de­
velopments supplied information that altered 
the conclusions substantially. Second is the 
equally human tendency to seek someone to 
blame for our mistakes. An investment that 
goes wrong must be the fault of someone 
else— hence the innumerable suits against 
auditors. It is no wonder that a technically 
proficient screening of such cases by the SIC 
finds so high a proportion of them to have no 
merit.
Third, few people understand the auditor’s 
role with respect to financial statements and 
business success. They ask, “ If an auditor 
says everything is all right, how could the 
company possibly fail?’’ But accountants 
know that, although a business failure may 
include an accounting failure, it seldom does. 
The profession should be prepared to make 
that point over and over. In today’s economy a 
change in a company’s fortune can have disas­
trous effects in a short time, often since the 
date of the most recent audit report.
As knowledgeable business people and ac­
countants, we should be slow to charge audit 
deficiencies until all the evidence is in. When 
in the company of those who are quick to do 
so, we should point out the weakness of their 
position. With peer review working as it is, 
few if any auditors will commence or com­
plete an engagement with the intention of do­
ing unsatisfactory work. Our task is not to 
protect the guilty, but if accountants are inter­
ested in a satisfactory public image of their 
profession, they must be prepared to reserve 
judgment until all the facts are in and should 
encourage others to do the same.
Conclusion
Recently a member of the AICPA board of 
directors asked me whether the POB had any 
objective measurement of the success of the 
self-regulatory program. He had nothing spe­
cific in mind but was thinking in terms of a 
lessening of the number of cases litigated year 
after year since the program started. My an­
swer had to be that we did not have such a 
measure and that I didn’t believe we ever 
would. There are so many uncontrollable and 
perhaps even unknown factors impinging on 
the amount of litigation against accountants 
that I don’t believe we can ever isolate and 
measure the specific impact of the AICPA 
program.
But that does not mean it has had no impact 
or will have no impact. Conceptually, the 
AICPA program is unique, far reaching and 
impressive. Practically, it is serving its pur­
pose well. The practice of public accounting 
in this country is improved day by day as 
peers review the professional performance of 
practicing accountants, hold them to compli­
ance with high standards, exchange views on 
additional improvements and report failures. 
It is still a young program and has a way to go 
before anyone will concede it is beyond im­
provement. The POB will continue to listen to 
critics and try to evaluate their comments. We 
will also take some modest pride in a program 
that is sound, in place and working well. ■
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Exhibit II
Public Oversight Board
Member
Term Expires 
December 31 Affiliation
Arthur M. Wood
Chairman*
1985 Former chairman and chief executive 
officer of Sears, Roebuck & Co.
John D. Harper 1985 Former chairman of Communications 
Satellite Corporation and former 
chairman and chief executive officer 
of Aluminum Company of America
Robert K. Mautz 1984 Professor of Accounting, University 
of Michigan
A. A. Sommer, Jr. 1984 Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 
Washington, D.C., and former SEC 
commissioner
Richard A. Stark Legal Counsel 
to the Board
Partner, Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy, New York
Permanent S ta ff
Louis W. Matusiak 
Charles J. Evers 
Alan H. Feldman 
Marcia E. Brown 
Miriam Freilich
Executive Director and Secretary 
Technical Director 
Assistant Technical Director 
Administrative Assistant 
Secretary
John J. McCloy, a partner in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy served as chairman until his resignation for personal reasons in February 1984. 
In August 1984, Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense, was appointed to the Board to fill the vacancy created by Mr. McCloy’s 
resignation.
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Exhibit I I I
SEC Practice Section
Executive Committee
M e m b e r F irm  A f f i l ia t io n
John W. Zick, Chairman 
John D. Abernathy, III 
George L. Bernstein 
Robert M. Coffman 
J. Michael Cook 
Mario J. Formichella 
James D. Glauser 
Clifford E. Graese 
Howard Groveman 
Charles Kaiser, Jr. 
Robert L. May 
J. Curt Mingle 
J. David Moxley 
Robert D. Neary 
Richard W. Paddock 
James J. Quinn 
Edward A. Reinerio 
John A. Thompson 
Jack C. Wahlig 
Michael A. Walker
* Price Waterhouse
* Seidman & Seidman
*Laventhol & Horwath
* Fox & Company
* Deloitte Haskins & Sells
*Arthur Young & Company 
Baird, Kurtz & Dobson
*Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
*Alexander Grant & Company 
Pannell Kerr Forster
*Arthur Andersen & Co.
Clifton Gunderson & Co.
*Touche Ross & Co.
*Ernst & Whinney 
Battelle & Battelle
*Coopers & Lybrand 
Johnson Grant & Co.
*Main Hurdman
*McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen 
Mann Judd Landau
Donald P. Zima May Zima & Co.
Firm entitled to permanent seat because firm audits 30 or more registrants under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
Peer Review Committee
Edward J. O’Grady, Chairman 
Thomas E. Byrne, Sr.
Michael L. Conway 
Arthur I. Farber 
Marvin Feller 
Robert E. Fleming 
Robert H. Haas 
John G. F. Knight 
Daniel J. Moylan 
David A. Nelson 
Joseph A. Puglisi 
Robert H. Temkin 
Frank H. Whitehand 
Jerry E. Whitehorn 
Prentice N. Ursery
Special Investigations Committee
Laventhol & Horwath 
Price Waterhouse 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Altschuler, Melvoin & Glasser 
Ernst & Whinney 
Fleming, Tempas & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand 
Purvis, Gray and Company 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen 
Touche Ross & Co.
Arthur Young & Company 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Whitehorn, Bradsher & Tankersley 
Pannell Kerr Forster
Robert A. Mellin, Chairman 
Mark J. Feingold
*Edwin P. Fisher 
*John J. Fox
Gerald E. Gorans
*Leroy Layton 
*Leon P. Otkiss
* David Wentworth 
Joseph A. Zulfer
Hood and Strong 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand 
Touche Ross & Co.
Main Hurdman 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen 
Ernst & Whinney
*
R etired
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